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"ARE WE THERE YET?"
TOWARDS A NEW RULE FOR
CHOICE OF LAW IN TORTO
BY JANET WALKER*
The Supreme Court's effort to establish certainty in this
area by basing a firm rule on a clear theory has failed.
The intention was laudable but the proposed theory
bore little relation to the courts' adjudicative concerns;
and the rule sometimes produced injustice, prompting
courts to circumvent it. This article considers the brief
history of choice of law in tort and recent developments
in common law and civil law jurisdictions, and suggests
a new theory and a new rule (based on principles of tort
law rather than public international law) which are
likely to increase certainty by promoting fairness.
La cour supreme n'a pas r6ussit b. 6tablir la certitude
dans ce domaine en se basant sur une r~gle d6finitive
6manant d'une th6orie claire. L'intention 6tait louable,
mais ]a th6orie proposee avait peu de lien avec les
questions juridiques a tre tranch6es par cette cour, et
la r~gle produisait parfois des injustices qui incitaient
les cours a la d~tourner. Cet article considre l'histoire
breve du choix du droit en responsabilit6 civile
dflictuelle et les d6veloppements r6cents dans les
traditions juridiques de common law et de droit civil.
L'auteure sugg~re la fois une nouvelle th~orie et une
nouvelle r~gle (bas6es sur des principes du droit des
d6lits plut6t que sur le droit international public) qui
devraient augmenter la certitude en encourageant
l'&quitd.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a classroom phenomenon that I have observed, as a
student and a teacher, so consistently in certain conflict of laws lectures
that I have come to call it "conflicts brow." It is a look of consternation,
not unlike that on the little faces in the back seat of a car on a long
journey, chorusing "Are we there yet?" To be fair, conflicts brow is more
prevalent in certain lectures than others. Topics like "total renvoi" and
"the incidental question" are sure to bring it on. Some say that the
reasons for this are obvious. But for less obvious reasons, conflicts brow
has been a regular feature of late in discussions of the rules for choice of
law in tort as well.
On occasion, when Professor Castel was confronted with this
phenomenon in choice of law discussions, he would explain wryly that
choice of law was one of the easiest subjects because there was really
only one rule for all areas of private law: "You apply the law most
substantially connected," he would say with a subtle accent. As a student,
I felt this was an unhelpful generalization. On other occasions, when
students were troubled by inconsistencies between the implications of
the established choice of law rule and the outcome of particular cases, he
would observe calmly that the courts routinely manipulated the rules to
produce a just result. I found this frustrating: either the decision in
question was wrong, or the rule was in need of reformulation, or we had
failed to appreciate the consistency between the two. I was simply not
prepared to accept that "result-oriented reasoning" was an adequate
explanation or a commendable practice. It has occurred to me since,
however, that in certain respects he was right on both counts. This article
tries to explain why it is helpful to bear these observations in mind in
formulating a new choice of law rule for tort claims.
In Part II of this article, I review an example of the case law
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following the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Tolofson v. Jensen:l
that of the Ontario courts in Hanlan v. Semesky.2 In that case, the courts
chose not to apply the law of the place where the tort occurred (the lex
loci) as recommended in Tolofson. In doing so, the courts had to choose
between two routes: distinguishing the Tolofson precedent by
distinguishing the case before it-an international case-from
interprovincial cases such as Tolofson; and reconsidering the rule in
Tolofson and the theory behind it. They chose the first route, and
applied the lexfori (the law of the forum). Although the implications of
both routes will be considered in this article, I will pursue the other
route first. This begins in Part III with an effort to place Tolofson in its
historical context. The brief history of choice of law in tort is described
as a widespread shift in recent decades away from the practice of
applying the lex fori to the practice, generally, of applying the lex loci
and, occasionally, of applying the personal law of the parties.
In Part IV, I return to the present and comment on the current
practice of applying a combination of a rule and an exception, and the
persistent uncertainty over when each of these alternatives (i.e., the rule
and the exception) should be invoked. This uncertainty suggests the
need for a better understanding of the rationale underlying the choice of
law rule, in other words, a unifying theory that would explain why the
rule or the exception was appropriate in any given case.
The Supreme Court of Canada advanced a theory of choice of
law in tort in Tolofson but, as I suggest in Parts V and VI, the particular
theory proposed in Tolofson-one that promotes application of the lex
loci-is ultimately unsuccessful in securing the certainty sought by the
Supreme Court. I argue that the Tolofson theory has not helped the
courts to understand why the lex loci is appropriate in the cases in which
courts sense that it should be applied; nor has this theory permitted the
courts to apply a law indicated by some other connecting factor when the
courts have sensed that this is appropriate. In Part VII, I explore an
alternative theory to that proposed in Tolofson and, in Part VIII, I
suggest a theory and, with reference to some of the European
codifications, I formulate a new rule from that theory. Finally, in Part
IX, I revisit the Hanlan case to examine the implications of the
distinction between interprovincial cases and international cases in
choice of law in tort, and I reconsider the constitutional imperatives in
I Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289 [hereinafter Tolofson cited to
S.C.R.I.
2 Hanlan v. Sernesky (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 603 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Hanlan (Gen.
Div.), aff'd (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 479 (C.A.) [hereinafter Hanlan (C.A.)].
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this area that were addressed in Tolofson.
II. A CRITICAL JUNCTURE
Some would say that the suggestion that a rule for choice of law
in tort still needs to be formulated is sheer pretence. Choice of law rules
for tort cases abound of late. Complete with Latin names3 and rich
doctrinal histories,4 and supported by profound theories based on lofty
principles of international law, they represent such a wealth of discussion
on the subject that, arguably, the last thing needed just now is more
discussion and another rule. Some would say this is particularly so in
Canada where, after half a century of discontent with the previous rule,S
the Supreme Court of Canada recently gave choice of law in tort an
overhaul, and where the new rule it pronounced in Tolofson,6 supported
by a detailed reformulation of the underlying principles, is only a few
years old. Still, in those few years, Canadian courts, such as the Ontario
courts in Hanlan, have moved swiftly to take maximum advantage of a
narrow exception speculated upon in obiter in Tolofson.
Before examining the rulings in Hanlan, a brief word is in order
about the circumstances in which the conflict of laws question arose-
but only a brief word is required as the case was of the sort that has
become the darling of conflicts lawyers: the cross-border traffic accident.
Two Ontario residents, Hanlan and Sernesky, went riding on Sernesky's
motorcycle, which was registered and insured in Ontario. They collided
with a car in Minnesota and the passenger, Hanlan, was injured. Claims
were brought against Sernesky both by Hanlan and by members of
Hanlan's family under the Family Law Act. 7
Following the release of the decision by the Supreme Court of
3 For example, lex loci delicti commissi, or lez loci for short. See discussion below in Parts III
and IV.
4 Such as that of the rule in Phillips v. Eyre (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 [hereinafter Phillips] which is
described in Boys v. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085 (H.L.) [hereinafter Boys]; and
Tolofson, supra note 1.
5 This discontent was prompted by the decision in McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] S.C.R. 62.
6 Tolofson, supra note 1.
7 The Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 61 provides for derivative claims for the family
members of injured persons who have suffered the loss of the injured person's economic or
emotional support.
[VOL. 38 No. 2334
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Canada in Tolofson,8 Sernesky brought a motion to dismiss the
derivative claims of Hanlan's family. Sernesky argued that the law of the
place where the tort occurred (i.e., Minnesota) should govern the matter.
Since claims of this sort were unknown to the law of Minnesota, it
followed that such claims should not be permitted to proceed in this case
even though the parties were from Ontario and the matter was being
heard in an Ontario court. There seemed to be strong support for this
argument in the lead judgment of La Forest J. in Tolofson. Nevertheless,
the Ontario Court (General Division) held that it was entitled to depart
from the requirement of applying the lex loci where the circumstances
were such that "the operation of the lex loci rule would work an
injustice." 9 The court invoked what has been termed in the English
jurisprudence "the flexible exception,"/0 and it applied the law of
Ontario, thereby permitting the derivative claims to proceed.
To achieve this result, the court relied upon the suggestion in
Tolofson that an exception might be permitted in international cases,
despite the fact that the configuration of contacts with various legal
systems in the Hanlan case was not particularly remarkable, and the
majority in Tolofson seemed dubious about the merits of such an
8 In Tolofson, supra note 1, and its companion case, Lucas v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022
[hereinafter Lucas] it will be recalled that the Supreme Court was asked to consider cases in which
passengers injured in motor vehicle accidents were suing both the drivers of the cars in which they
were riding and the drivers of the cars with which they collided. In both cases, the passengers were
suing in courts of their home provinces (which were also the home provinces of the drivers of the
cars in which they were riding) and not in the courts of the provinces where the accidents occurred.
The plaintiffs were seeking to have the laws of their home provinces apply so that they could avoid
provisions of the laws of the places where the accidents occurred. In Tolofson, the plaintiff wanted
to avoid the application of a limitation period and the need to show wilful or wanton negligence. In
Lucas, the plaintiffs wanted to avoid the restrictions on tort recovery contained in the no-fault
system of the place where the accident occurred. In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the
law of the place where the accident occurred should govern.
9 Hanlan (Gen. Div.),supra note 2 at 610-11.
10 The flexible exception to the common law tort choice of law rule is described in recent
editions of L. Collins, ed. Dicey & Morris: The Conflict of Laws (London: Stevens & Sons, 1987)
[hereinafter Dicey & Morris]. The version of the rule considered in Tolofson is Rule 205(1) and (2)
of the 11 th edition, published in 1987, which reads as follows:
Rule 205. --
(1) As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as
such in England, only if it is both
(a) actionable as a tort according to English law, or in other words is an act which,
if done in England, would be a tort; and
(b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done.
(2) But a particular issue between the parties may be governed by the law of the
country which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and the parties.
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exception.11 Still, the court in Hanlan rejected rigid adherence to the
strict rule and, in a brief per curiam judgment, the Court of Appeal for
Ontario affirmed this result.1 2 The courts seemed indifferent as to
whether this would further the lofty principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court of Canada. They seemed, on the one hand, confident
that the application of Ontario law in this case would produce a just
result for the parties and, on the other hand, content that their approach
was not prohibited by the Tolofson authority.
The Ontario courts in Hanlan applied Professor Castel's
"one-size-fits-all" choice of law rule-the "law most substantially
connected." They did so in spite of the Supreme Court's apparent effort
in Tolofson to entrench the lex loci rule, because, as Professor Castel also
suggested, they simply sensed that this was the right thing to do to
produce a just result. While this explanation could be entirely correct (as
will be explored in greater detail below), it would not promote doctrinal
clarity. Indeed, if we agree with the result in Hanlan (a result which does
not appear to have been criticized), we find ourselves at a critical
juncture. Either we must accept that there is a meaningful distinction
between international and interprovincial cases that would warrant the
availability of the flexible exception in one and not the other, or we must
question the elimination of the flexible exception in interprovincial cases
directly. Freed of the dictates of stare decisis and the pressure to decide
11 See, for example, J.-G. Castel, "Back to the Future! Is the "New" Rigid Choice of Law Rule
for Interprovincial Torts Constitutionally Mandated?" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 35. Support for
this interpretation arguably could be found in the fact that Major and Sopinka JJ. were prompted to
join in the only secondary judgment to be issued in any of the four leading conflict of laws decisions
by the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 1990s in order to opine that the exception should
not be eliminated entirely. See also J. Swan, "Federalism and the Conflict of Laws: The Curious
Position of the Supreme Court of Canada" (1995) 46 South Carolina L.R. 923.
12 The Hanlan (CA) judgment, supra note 2 in its entirety, reads:
In accordance with Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289, we are
satisfied that the motions judge had a discretion to apply the lex fori in circumstances
where the lex loci delicti rule would work an injustice. Justice Platana purported to
exercise that discretion and ruled that in the particular circumstances before him, the
operation of the lex loci rule would work an injustice. In coming to this conclusion, it is
apparent that Mr. Justice Platana considered the following factors: 1. that the parties
were both resident in Ontario; 2. that the contract of insurance was issued in Ontario; 3.
that there was no connection with the State of Minnesota other than that it was the place
of the accident; 4. that although the accident occurred in Minnesota, the consequences to
members of the injured plaintiffs family were directly felt in Ontario; and 5. that the
uncontradicted evidence before him was that claims of this nature are not permitted
under Minnesota law.
We are not persuaded that Mr. Justice Platana erred in exercising his
discretion as he did. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
[VOL. 38 No. 2
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particular cases, I propose to follow the second route on the basis that it
holds the promise of improving the state of the law. To reconsider the
ruling in Tolofson, however, it is first necessary to appreciate its
historical context.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY
If, by "choice of law rule," we mean a rule that calls for the
application of foreign law in tort cases involving certain legally relevant
foreign elements, then the rule has a very short history in the common
law-scarcely more than a few decades. In Canada, this history began
with the Tolofson decision. 13 Before Tolofson and similar developments
elsewhere, the prevailing so-called "choice of law" rule effectively
directed the courts to apply their own law to determine the rights and
obligations of parties to all torts.1 4 The only caveat was that no liability
would exist if the tort had occurred abroad and the conduct complained
of was justifiable by the law of the place where the defendant had
engaged in it. In other words, until quite recently, common law courts
always applied their own law-the lex fori"-to tort claims regardless of
the connections that might exist between the parties or the events and
other legal systems. Foreign law (generally, the law of the place where
the tort occurred-the lex loci delicti commissi or lex loci) was relevant
only as a possible defence.15 Thus, the lexfori dominated "choice of law"
13 It is still the case today that courts generally consider applying foreign law only in cases
where the tort has occurred abroad. Although it is argued later in this article that torts occurring
within the jurisdiction of the forum should be governed by a foreign law where the relationship
between the parties indicates that a foreign law should govern the relationship. See U.K., Law
Commission/Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict,
(Law Corn No 193/Scot Law Corn 129) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1990) where, at
paras. 3.15-3.19 the Commission considered and rejected the possibility of including in the
legislation "A Proviso for Torts and Delicts Occurring within the United Kingdom," concluding that
"the potential injustice in the application of our law in respect of torts and delicts committed in the
United Kingdom is not obvious."
14 As Catherine Walsh astutely observed, "A choice of law rule that directs the court to apply
its own law is a choice of law rule in name only": see C. Walsh, "Territoriality and Choice of Law in
the Supreme Court of Canada: Applications in Products Liability Claims" (1997) 76 Can. Bar Rev.
91 at 100.
15 Although this kind of reference to the lex loci is commonly attributed to the 1870 decision
of the Privy Council in Phillips, supra note 4, Christopher Morse traced such reasoning to a Privy
Council decision two centuries earlier in Blad's case (1674), 3 Swan 603. In that decision, some
English traders sued a Dane, Blad, for seizing their property in Iceland. Blad asked the Privy
Council to stay the proceeding because the seizure was authorized by a monopoly he held on the
fishing trade in Iceland. The Privy Council said it was unnecessary to grant a stay of proceedings
2000]
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in tort for some three centuries. 16 It was so controlling that no liability
could be found for conduct that was wrongful in the place abroad where
it occurred if the conduct was not also wrongful under the law of the
forum. 17
In recent decades, preoccupation with the lex fori came to be
denounced as excessively parochial. It was thought that the lex loci
should play a larger role in determining tort liability than simply forming
the basis for a defence. It was argued that routine application of the lex
fori has very little to do with the just resolution of tort claims that were
principally connected to other legal systems. Application of the lex fori
could only be justified on the basis of a court's obligation to promote
local standards and this was not essential to the adjudication of tort
claims. As La Forest J. observed in Tolofson, "The court takes
jurisdiction not to administer local law, but for the convenience of
litigants, with a view to responding to modern mobility and the needs of
a world or national economic order." 18
This shift in approach to choice of law in tort was the result of an
evolution in tort law. As the Scottish and English Law Commissioners
explained in their report, the old choice of law rule was the product of a
previous era in which "the law of tort and delict was formerly seen, much
more than it is today, as having a punitive rather than a compensatory
function. As such it was more closely allied to criminal law, an area of
law where there is no question of a court in this country applying
anything other than the domestic law of England or Scotland."19
Criminal laws, like other public laws that are seen to be the emanation of
the sovereign will, are not migratory and there is no scope for choice of
law analysis. Generally, only the courts of the place in which a crime is
committed have jurisdiction and they invariably apply their own law. If
the defendant is arrested abroad, the matter does not proceed where the
defendant is found with those courts applying the law of the place where
because the court hearing the case would consider the defence available to Blad under the tax loci as
an effective defence to the claim brought against him in the English court: see C.G.J. Morse, Torts
in Private International Law, vol. 2 (Oxford: North-Holland, 1978) at 25.
16 There was debate over whether a lack of civil liability under the lex loci would suffice as a
defence or whether a complete lack of legal liability was required: Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2
L.R.Q.B. 231; and McLean v. Pettigrew, supra note 5, and whether a limitation on recovery found in
the lex loci would apply even if the parties had close ties to the forum: Boys, supra note 4.
17 The Halley (1868), L.R. 2 P.C. 193.
18 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1070. Except, of course, where mandatory laws and public policy
interrupt the normal choice of law process.
19 U.K. Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of
Law in Tort and Delict, (Law Com No 193/Scot Law Com 129) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1990) at para. 2.6.
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the crime was said to occur. Rather, the defendant is extradited so that
the courts of the place where the crime was said to occur are able to
proceed.
The adjudication of tort matters once served a similar public
purpose except that the element of party prosecution somehow entitled
victims to pursue defendants in fora other than those in the place where
the tort occurred. Still, in adjudicating the claim, the courts were
conceived of as serving a local public purpose akin to a criminal
prosecution and, therefore, would be obliged to apply local law. Tort law
is now generally recognized to be substantially different from criminal
law and, therefore, truly a form of "private" law. The public continues to
have an interest in the standards of conduct established in tort cases but
the resolution of any given dispute is mainly intended to do justice
between the parties. Primarily concerned with dispute resolution, the
courts are not obligated to reiterate, refine or advance local standards of
conduct, but to apply the most appropriate standards to the conduct
complained of in the action.20
This evolution in tort law produced a groundswell of change in
the approach taken to choice of law rules, shifting emphasis from the
application of the lex fori to the application of other laws, often the lex
loci. The shift away from the lexfori occurred through a variety of means.
In 1989, the High Court of Australia found its mandate for this in the
Australian Constitution.21 In 1993, the Privy Council managed to apply
the lex loci instead of the lexfori through clever manipulation of existing
doctrine in Red Sea Insurance.22 In 1995, courts in the United Kingdom
were directed by legislation generally to apply the lex loci subject to a
flexible exception. 23 This groundswell of change brought common law
courts into line with the well-established practice of civil law courts.24
20 It is worth digressing briefly to note again the logical corollary to this, which has yet to be
explored in detail in the case law. That is, that our courts should be prepared to extend choice of law
analysis to torts that occur locally where close connections to other legal systems make it suitable to
apply the standards of conduct of those other legal systems to the conduct in question. See note 13,
supra.
21 Breavington v. Godleman (1988), 169 C.L.R. 41 [hereinafter Breavington], 80 A.L.R. 362
(H.C.); but see McKain v. Miller (1991), 174 C.L.R. 1, (1992) 104 A.LR. 257 [hereinafter McKain];
Stevens v. Head (1993), 176 C.L.R. 433 [hereinafter Stevens]; and see John Pfeiffer Ply Limited v.
Rogerson (2000), 74 A.J.L.R. 1109 (Aus. H.C.) [hereinafter Pfeiffer].
22 Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v. Bouygues SA, [1994] 3 W.L.R. 926.
23 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, (U.K.) 1995 [hereinafter PIL].
24 Relevant statutory provisions cited with reference in M. Reimann, Conflict of Laws in
Western Europe: A Guide Through the Jungle (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1995)
[hereinafter Conflict of Laws] include: Austrian Federal Law, art. 48, s. 1: see E. Palmer, "The
20001
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There is now a widespread consensus that it is not appropriate to apply
the lexfor4 and that it is appropriate in most cases to apply the lex loci.
IV. THE RULE AND THE EXCEPTION
The widespread trend away from application of the lex fori, and
generally toward application of the lex loci, has been embraced as
producing a just result in most cases. However, it sheds little light on the
result in cases like Hanlan. In Hanlan, it will be recalled, the Ontario
courts were determined to apply Ontario law-not the lex loci. This was
not because the courts doubted the appropriateness of applying the lex
loci in most cases. The fact that the matter was being adjudicated in
Ontario was not the reason why the Ontario Courts wished to revert to
the application of the lex fori. Rather, it was because the courts sensed
that the Hanlan case fit the requirements of a well-defined class of
exceptional cases in which justice required the court to disregard the law
of the place in which the tort occurred in favour of some other law. In
Hanlan, this other law was the personal law of the parties. The Court of
Appeal regarded Hanlan as fitting within this well-defined class of
exceptional cases for two reasons: the parties were both residents of a
place other than the place where the accident occurred; and there was
no connection with the place where the accident occurred other than the
fact that it was the place of the accident.
An exception favouring the personal law of the parties is so well
established as to be a regular feature of almost every conflict of laws
regime that generally requires application of the lex loci. For example,
the second paragraph of article 3126 of the Quebec Civil Code2S
Austrian Codification of Conflict of Laws" (1980) 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 197; Greek Civil Code, art 26;
Italian Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, art. 62, s. 1: see A. Montanari and V. Narcisi, Conflict of Laws
in Italy (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 59; Spanish Civil Code, art. 10, s. 9; Portuguese
Civil Code, art 45, s. 1. Relevant rules developed by courts and scholars cited by Reiman include:
France-H. Batiffol & P. Lagarde, Droit International Privd, 8th ed., vol 2, (Paris, Librairie g6n6rale
de droit et de jurisprudence, 1993) at 237-239; Germany-G. Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht, 6th
ed. (Mfilnchen: C.H. Beck, 1987) at 403 and German Draft Code, art. 40, s. 1, see Gildeggen and
Langkeit, "The New Conflict of Laws Code Provisions of the Federal Republic of Germany:
Introductory Comment and Translation" (1986) 17 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 229; Netherlands-M.
Das, "Conflict of Laws," in S.R. Schuit et al., Dutch Business Law, (Boston: Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, 1989) at 4-49 - 4-51, and Th. de Boer & R. Kotting, "Private International
Law" in J.M.J. Chorus et al. ed., Introduction to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers, 2nd ed. (Boston,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993) at 234; Denmark-A. Philip, "Private International
Law" in A. Gammelthoff-Jansen, B. Gomard and A. Philip, eds. Danish Law: a general survey
(Copenhagen: Gads, 1982) at 346; and Finland-H.T. Klami, Private International Law in Finland
(Turku: University of Turku, Faculty of Law,1986) at 38.
25 Art. 1260 C.C.Q.
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provides, by way of exception to the general rules laid down in the first
paragraph, that "In any case where the person who committed the
injurious act and the victim have their domiciles or residences in the
same country, the law of that country applies." Similar exceptions can
be found in the codes of many other civil law countries.26
This exception is not part of a "homeward trend"27 in which
courts are tempted to apply their own law in spite of strong connections
to another place. It is likely that in cases where the parties' domiciles
coincide in some place other than the place of tort, their place of
domicile will also be the most convenient place in which to resolve the
dispute. In these cases the personal law of the parties will also happen to
be the lex fori. Still, the court applies its own law because it is the
personal law of the parties, not because it is the lex fori. This suggests
that where the parties' personal law is neither that of the forum nor that
of the place of tort, courts should be prepared to consider applying the
law of that third place. It also suggests that courts should be prepared to
apply a foreign law in certain cases concerning torts that have occurred
locally.
Despite the broad consensus regarding the need for a flexible
exception to do justice to these kinds of cases, there has been lingering
uncertainty about when it should be invoked. If, while in Ontario, one
foreigner harms another from the same country, should we apply our law
or theirs to the claim? If a person from Ontario injures a stranger in
another country and it turns out that the stranger is also from Ontario
should we apply Ontario law to the claim? Such questions have plagued
decisionmaking in this area, creating uncertainty and maintaining
considerable scope for manipulative lawyering. Under these
circumstances, courts have yearned for more complete guidance in the
form of a rationale or a theory that would explain the operation of the
rules and thereby provide direction for their proper application. This is
26 Rules noted in Conflict of Laws, supra note 24 also include: Austrian Federal Law, art. 48, s.
1; Portuguese Civil Code, art. 45, s. 3; Italian Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, art. 62, s. 2; and the
German Draft Code, art. 40, s. 2 and art. 41.
27 Although the confusion over this appears to linger in the English academic commentary.
See, for example, in Johnson v Coventry Churchill, [1992] 3 All E.R. 14, when an English carpenter
hired by an English employment agency to work in Germany was injured on the job where in that
case, the court held in an action against his English employer that he could rely on the obligation
under English law of his employer to provide a safe workplace even though the absence of
wilfulness in the employer's conduct would have absolved it of liability under German law. Peter
North comments on this result as follows: "Although this decision provides a further example of a
homeward trend to the law of the forum, it does so in circumstances where the result seems quite
acceptable": P.M. North, Essays in Private International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at
69-70.
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where the contribution of the Supreme Court of Canada promised to be
most helpful.
V. TOLOFSON AND THE SEARCH FOR A UNIFYING THEORY
Like the other three leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions
of the last decade that sought to provide a theoretical framework for the
main areas of conflict of laws, 28 the Tolofson decision is likely to be
remembered for its extraordinary commitment to the project of
developing a principled approach to choice of law in tort-an approach
based on a sound theoretical foundation and responsive to the
underlying reality in which tort choice of law rules operate.
What is this underlying reality? For La Forest J. it is the
"territorial limits of law under the international legal order." These
limits are derived from public international law and they are expressed
in terms of sovereignty and comity. Rules operating under the auspices
of sovereignty and comity acknowledge the rights of governments to
make and apply laws within their own territorial limits, and the
obligation of courts to respect those rights by refraining from imposing
local laws on cases arising in other jurisdictions.
This is an attractive theory for choice of law analysis. The conflict
of laws has often times seemed a subject that is betwixt and between the
main legal disciplines. Not quite private law, or procedure, or
international law, it has tended to operate in the shadows of these
subjects as a strange admixture of discrete doctrines and "general
considerations." The thought that choice of law rules could now be
deduced from the established principles of public international law
seemed a welcome development to many. No doubt such a theory would
promise to soothe many a conflicts brow.
Unfortunately, the conflicts brow phenomenon has not been
confined to the classroom but has, on occasion, found its way into the
courtroom; and this is perhaps where the true test of a good legal theory
occurs. For a good theory will provide both a compelling explanation for
the correctness of a ruling that we sense is just and a basis for
anticipating the appropriate or just result in a range of circumstances
that raise similar or related questions. A good theory is more than a
28 Morguard Investments Ltd v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256
[hereinafter Morguard cited to S.C.R.]; Amchem v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96; and Hunt v. T&N m'xc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 109
D.L.R. (4th) 16.
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useful rule. Since a rule merely identifies a reliable correlation (in this
case between the facts and the applicable law), it can be useful even
when it admits of an exception. But a good theory-one that explains the
underlying legal principle-should account for the proper application of
both the rule and the exception.
We know that courts are generally inclined these days to apply
the law of the place where a tort occurs. If the theory put forward in
Tolofson was a good one then, in a case in which a court was inclined to
apply the law of the place where the tort occurred, the Tolofson theory
would assist in providing compelling reasons for doing so. What
compelling reasons does Tolofson provide? According to the theory in
that case, courts apply foreign law for reasons of comity. But in pouring
over the Tolofson judgment in search of guidance, a motions court judge
might well wonder what comity has to do with whether she should, for
example, disregard the guest statute in the place where the accident
occurred. 29 Similarly, another court might wonder what guidance comity
would provide with respect to whether, for example, he should dismiss a
derivative claim founded on the parties' personal law on the basis that it
would be unknown to the law of the place where the accident occurred?
Even if these courts regularly addressed conflict of laws
questions, they would be no further ahead in making the connection
between the dictates of comity and the justice of applying a guest statute
or permitting a derivative claim. This is because it is far from clear that
there is any meaningful connection between comity and choice of law
analysis. Common law courts engage in choice of law analysis only when
one of the parties considers it potentially advantageous to his or her case
to have the law of some other place applied to the matter. Surely, if the
application of foreign law was a matter of comity, it would be in the
hands of the court and it would not be subject to party prosecution. 30
Further, the application of foreign law is subject to party prosecution not
only with respect to the desire of one of the parties to have the foreign
law applied but also with respect to the proof of the foreign law. Thus,
despite their recognition of the obligation, following Tolofson, to apply
the lex loci, some courts have declined to do so on the basis that the lex
29 For more extensive discussions of the question of the relevance of comity to choice of law in
tort see P. Kincaid, "Jensen v. Tolofson and the Revolution in Tort Choice of Law" (1995) 74 Can.
Bar Rev. 537 at 540-546; and R.M. Junger, "Case Comment: Tolofson vJensen" (1996) 23 Man. L.J.
689.
30 See R. Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
and Petkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 per Dickson C.J.C.
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loci was not adequately proved by the party seeking to have it applied.31
Finally, the obligation of another court to enforce a judgment generally
will not be affected by the way the issuing court treated the law of the
enforcing court's jurisdiction in the course of adjudicating the dispute.32
The failure to apply the law of the enforcing court's jurisdiction or the
failure to apply it properly does not appear to violate comity or even to
diminish the obligation to enforce the judgment.
Perhaps, at bottom, basing the lex loci rule on comity confuses
the ideas of public and private law and it overlooks the principles of
party autonomy and party prosecution that are fundamental to private
law adjudication. Clearly, states have an interest in seeing certain laws
applied in some adjudicative settings. Such laws are public laws-
criminal and regulatory laws-and the state is directly involved in
identifying and prosecuting violations of such laws in criminal and
administrative law adjudicative settings. Under traditional notions of
private law adjudication, however, the state is indifferent to whether
individual claims are pursued. Parties to such disputes are free to agree
to compromise and to settle the matter between themselves. They are
free to have the matter decided by some body other than a court and, in
so doing, to choose their own adjudicator. They are free to resolve the
matter in accordance with whatever rules they choose. Thus, although a
state has an interest in the maintenance of the standards of conduct that
are endorsed by courts in adjudicating tort claims, it has no overriding or
pre-emptive iiiterest in ensuring the application of these standards in
particular cases. All in all, it seems clear that comity is not the guiding
principle for choice of law in general and the operation of the lex loci
rule in particular.33
31 See, for example, Nystrom v. Tamava (1996), 44 Alta. L.R. 355 (Q.B.).
32 See Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 155.
33 Peter Nygh offered the following observations concerning the objectives of choice of law
rules:
Choice of law rules seek to meet a number of objectives. Generally speaking, they are not
concerned with the protection or application of governmental interests. Exceptions exist
where a governmental interest is directly involved as in state immunity, or where a statute
expressly or by necessary implication asserts a governmental interest, as will be discussed
further below. But primarily the conflict of laws is concerned with the reconciliation of
private interests and expectations.
(P. Nygh, Conflict of Laws in Australia, 6 ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1995) at 33). The argument in
the foregoing paragraphs in the text (Le., that the principles of public international law are largely
irrelevant to choice of law analysis) should be qualified. It is based upon the traditional approach to
these principles, apparent in Tolofson, which treats them as consisting largely in respect for the
rights of sovereign states to define local standards (such as those for tort) autonomously. Clearly, it
is possible to conceive of international law differently. To the extent that the availability of a
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Still, whether the reasoning in Tolofson can account for the lex
loci rule might not be the best measure of it. If, as an authority, the
Tolofton decision permits the courts to do what they sense is right, they
will probably not trouble themselves too much with the theory behind it.
A better test of the Tolofson theory, then, might be whether it supports
the varied results that courts sense are warranted in varying
circumstances. Rather than asking whether the Tolofson theory accounts
for the application of the lex loci in cases where this seems appropriate, it
might be better to ask whether the Tolofson theory permits the courts to
apply some law other than the lex loci when they are inclined to do so. In
other words, does the Tolofson theory support the use of the flexible
exception? Unfortunately, it does not. A commitment to the territorial
principle in international law as the "underlying reality" that supports
the application of the lex loci in most situations, would seem to require
that the flexible exception be relegated to responding to a competing
interest of less importance. Thus, the Supreme Court described the
competing interests in choice of law rules as those of "order" and
"fairness." As the court in Tolofson said, "the underlying principles of
private international law are order and fairness, order must come first.
Order is a pre-condition to justice." 34
The notion that fairness in individual cases should be sacrificed
for the sake of order in the law seems to accord more with a civil law
approach than a common law approach. As one European conflict of
laws scholar, Mathias Reimann, observed, "As a general matter,
European conflicts law is marked by a comparatively greater preference
for certainty, logical consistency, and stability of rules, and for
predictability of results over justice in the individual case." 3s He went on
to explain, "... blackletter rules are, in principle, desirable, not
deplorable. The clearer rules cut, the better. The underlying assumption
is that if a rule incorporates the appropriate policies and interests and is
well-drafted, its blackletter character will not lead to unjust results,
except in extreme, and thus rare, cases."
Common law courts of first instance, engaged in private law
adjudication, tend to resist treating a fair outcome as merely one of
several possible objectives. The threat posed by the flexible exception to
the doctrinal coherence of the theory in Tolofson seems less troubling to
"flexible exception" in favour of the application of some law other than the lex loci is so widespread
as to establish a consistent state practice integral to providing a just result in a civil claim, a rigid
requirement that the courts apply the lex loci to every case could be seen as denying the basic
entitlement to a fair adjudication of a civil claim, and, in this way, violating an international norm.
34 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1058.
35 Conflict of Laws, supra note 24 at 13.
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common law courts than compromising the fairness of the outcome in
the case before them. Such courts are not readily persuaded that the
result in any given case does not matter because it would "come out in
the wash."36 While the differences between the tort laws of the
Canadian provinces tend to be subtle and few, it is only when these
differences loom large (in the sense that they are likely to have a
substantial if not dispositive effect on the outcome) that they give rise to
disputes over the applicable law. Reasoning from the case to the rule
(rather than the other way around as is done in the civil law), common
law courts begin with the intuition that a particular result in a particular
case is right and then seek to articulate the correlation between the facts
and the result to form a rule to provide guidance in similar cases. Where
the application of this rule in some cases proves regularly to produce an
unjust result, an exception emerges and this can sometimes be
articulated with sufficient precision to form a subsidiary part of the rule.
For direction on whether the rule or the exception applies, it is
sometimes necessary to refer to a guiding principle. However, this is
always subject to review based on a court's intuition about the justice of
the result produced by the rule it supports in a the case before it.
VI. HARD CASES AND THE NEED FOR A BETTER RULE
This is where the dialogue between the Supreme Court of
Canada and the lower courts comes into play. The theory in Tolofson
would be more helpful if, in addition to supporting the application of the
lex loci where that seemed appropriate, it also supported the courts'
desire to apply some law other than the lex loci where they sensed that
this was clearly the right thing to do. It would also be helpful if it gave
the courts guidance in situations of uncertainty as to when they should
apply the rule and when they should apply the exception. Unfortunately
it does not. The Ontario courts read Tolofson as advancing an underlying
theory for choice of law in tort that inevitably gave rise to a strict
application of the lex loci and left room only for exceptions based on
public policy or on the fact that the laws of potential application were
those of different countries. They did not explain why the distinction
between interprovincial and international conflicts of laws mattered.
They did not seem particularly interested in the theory underlying such a
distinction. Apparently, they saw their role as confined to doing justice
in the case before them and complying, as much as possible, with binding
36 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1059.
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precedent.
In fact, this is where it pinches. All the eloquent arguments in
favour of certainty and the need to apply a simple hard and fast rule
equally to all cases mean little to litigants and their counsel when the
rules seem to produce unjust results in their cases. What matters to
litigants and their counsel is their case. Moreover, while it may seem
persuasive to say that cases that raise conflict of laws questions are
relatively rare, that those that warrant an exception to a general rule are
rarer still, and that the time and trouble to provide special
accommodation in the law for such a small percentage of cases is not
warranted, it misses the point to do so. A court presented with a well
argued case demonstrating that an exception to the application of the lex
fori is warranted is not deciding every tort case; nor is it deciding every
choice of law in tort case. The court does not regard itself as engaged in
deciding a small percentage of the possible cases. It is engaged first and
foremost in deciding the case before it. To the extent that courts cannot
be persuaded to be stoical in imposing a rigid rule, the arguments
favouring a rigid rule for the sake of certainty are misplaced because
they will only produce a jurisprudence of decisions distinguishing the
precedent on ill-conceived grounds.37
So we find ourselves back at the starting point. Perhaps we are
further ahead, though, in that we might now pursue a slightly different
course-one that follows a method inspired by the common law but that
also makes use of current civil law codifications of the rules. To re-state
the question posed by cases like Hanlan: is it possible to discern in the
decisions of courts and academic statements of the law regarding the
flexible exception some regularity or uniformity that could be articulated
as a rule? One promising place to start would be with a typical civil code
formulation such as that found in the Quebec Civil Code. Article 3126
provides in part that "In any case where the person who committed the
injurious act and the victim have their domiciles or residences in the
same country, the law of that country applies." Could we say that a
coincidence of the parties' domicile or residence warrants application of
the parties' personal law rather than the lex loci?
In many cases in which the parties' domiciles or residences
coincide, it is appropriate to apply their personal law, but this is not
37 Thus, it is with a certain irony that we look back on Tolofson's accolades such as the
following: "Certainty and simplicity have triumphed in Canadian conflict of laws. Having lex loci
delicti as the strict choice of law rule for intra Canadian multi-jurisdictional torts-but with a rare
exception in relation to international torts-simplifies the judicial task and will promote
settlements, reduce transaction costs and promote efficiencies within the legal system": J.P.
McEvoy, "Choice of Law in Torts: The New Rule" (1995) 44 U.N.B.L.J. 211 at 224.
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always so. Justice La Forest considered this problem in Tolofson. He
rightly criticized the mechanical application of the personal law of the
parties as capable of producing anomalous results. He asked, "Why
should we allow an exception at all where two residents of the forum
fortuitously happen to meet each other head-on on the road? Should luck
be on your side because you happen to crash into another Ontario
resident while driving in Quebec, instead of crashing into a
Quebecer?" 38 There seems little doubt that results based on fortuitous
factors are arbitrary and unjust. This is so whether these factors point to
the application of the lex loci or to the personal law of the parties.
Results based on fortuitous factors produce a windfall for a plaintiff at
an undeserved expense to the defendant. We sometimes tolerate some
arbitrariness in the relationship between fault and compensation in tort
cases in the determination of damages (for example, that sometimes a
small degree of carelessness can produce significant harm and,
therefore, a large award in damages). However, we are less prepared to
tolerate arbitrariness in the standards applied to determine the basic
entitlement to recovery. After all, when we invoke the personal law of
the parties as an exception to the lex loci, we do so because the place of
the tort in the context of the case as a whole seems merely fortuitous and
therefore an arbitrary basis for applying the lex loci. It hardly seems
right, then, to apply the personal law of the parties when the coincidence
of their personal laws is itself fortuitous.
Rigid demarcation of the scope of an exception to the lex loci
through reference to mechanical factors like the personal law of one or
both of the parties, then, can also work an injustice.39 Perhaps we need a
better formulated rule-one that does not rely on mechanical factors to
determine when to apply the lex loci and when to apply the exception.
This was the course pursued by the English law. Like our courts, the
English courts have generally been content to work with rules in choice
of law in tort. They have not been very interested in theory. They have
tended to deal in rules and to leave the theorizing to their Law
Commission. When their old rule (the rule in Philips v. Eyre) became
outdated, the English and Scottish Law Commissions suggested revisions
and Parliament passed legislation. Now they apply the new law. It
contains a general rule and an exception which the courts apply based on
their own discretion exercised in accordance with the guidance provided
38 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1058 [emphasis added].
39 Moreover, as La Forest J. noted, mechanical application of this exception is even more
troublesome than the rigid application of the lex loci in that it is subject to manipulation by counsel
through contrivances such as artificial joinder. See Tolofson, supra note I at 1061.
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by the legislation. The English courts seem more or less content. One
day, when they sense that they can no longer do justice to the cases
before them through a sensitive interpretation of the legislation, further
revision will be required. In the meantime, their legislative provision for
the exception seems to describe generally what our courts seem inclined
to do when faced with a case that warrants an application of the
exception to the rule. It provides:
12(1) If it appears, in all the circumstances, from a comparison of -
(a) the significance of the factors which connect a tort or delict with the country whose
law would be the applicable law under the general rule; and
(b) the significance of any factors connecting the tort or delict with another country,
that it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable law for determining the issues
arising in the case, or any of those issues, to be the law of the other country, the general
rule is displaced and the applicable law for determining those issues or that issue (as the
case may be) is the law of that other country.
(2) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting a tort or delict with a
country for the purposes of this section include, in particular, factors relating to the
parties, to any of the events which constitute the tort or delict in question or to any of the
circumstances or consequences of those events.4 0
Are we there yet? Again, with the greatest of respect to the U.K.
legislators, it would seem that we have still some distance to go.
Although this provision seems to describe well what the courts do when
they make sound choice of law rulings in the exceptional tort cases being
considered, it has little predictive or prescriptive value. The provision in
precis seems to do no more than to invite courts to consider all the
relevant factors and to use their good judgement. While it identifies the
kinds of factors that are relevant and invites the courts to weigh their
relative significance, it does not advert to any unifying theory or
underlying purpose that would be decisive in the exercise of the court's
judgement. In failing to account for the exercise of discretion, it does
little more than to recommend that the courts apply "the law most
substantially connected." 41
40 PIL, supra note 23, Part III-Choice of Law in Tort and Delict. Interestingly, although this
provision initially appears to be a reformulation of Rule 205 in Dicey and Morris, supra note 10, the
flexible exception which operated then to avoid the double actionability requirement now operates
to avoid the requirement to apply the lex loci.
41 For more incisive and extensive criticism, see A. Briggs, "Choice of Law in Tort and Delict"
(1995) L.M.C.L.Q. 519.
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VII. A "NEW" THEORY
It would seem, then, that the Supreme Court of Canada's pursuit
of a unifying theory in Tolofson was unavoidable. 42 We need a theory of
choice of law in tort that accounts for the operation of the rule and the
exception and guides the courts in situations of uncertainty. Where
should we look for it? One clue may be found in the confidence with
which the courts decide some cases despite the absence of authoritative
guidance. Another may be in the striking unanimity, noted earlier, with
which common law courts in the commonwealth abandoned reference to
the lexfori despite the lack of coherence in the explanations offered for
this move. The sheer determination of the Ontario courts to retain the
benefit of the opportunity enjoyed by other commonwealth courts to
invoke the flexible exception similarly suggests that the courts are
confident that they know exactly what they are doing without the benefit
of any theory. How could this be? The courts must be testing the rules
set down by precedent or legislation against some strong intuition about
the just result or some notion of an organizing principle. What could the
source of it be?
Perhaps we have not yet identified a suitable reference point for
a unifying theory because we have been looking in the wrong direction.
The Tolofson decision exhorted us to look above and beyond local law to
the lofty principles traditionally associated with public international law:
sovereignty, comity and territoriality. In choice of law analysis, the courts
consider the way in which applying the law of the forum might fail to
produce a just result in the case and they consider whether to apply
some other law. It seems logical, then, that the authority for this analysis
would be above and beyond local law. As a result, there has been a
tendency to search for an external principle, a higher authority. In
Tolofson, this search yielded the territorial principle of public
international law and comity, which, as we saw, was not very helpful.
Perhaps though, instead of looking upwards or outwards to
principles of public international law, we should be looking "inwards" or
"downwards" to the nature of the adjudication sought to be made-in
other words, we should be looking to tort law and its internal logic for
guiding principles. After all, when a court is presented with a claim, for
example, for compensation for personal injury arising out of a car
accident, the court's main reference points are those of the tradition of
42 And not isolated. See, for example, the chapter entitled "The Foundations of Choice of
Law Rules" in A.J.E. Jaffey, Topics in Choice of Law, (London: British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, 1996).
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tort law, such as deterrence, loss spreading and corrective justice, not
sovereignty, or comity. The court's instinct is to do justice between the
parties based on that tradition. When the court is asked to have regard
to the fact that the accident occurred in another country or to consider
whether the law of another place should apply for some other reason,
the court adjusts its determinations to accord with the applicable law.
This does not alter the fundamental nature of the adjudication. The
court might rise above the particular allocations of rights and obligations
between the parties described in the local law, but it still regards itself in
some fundamental way as resolving a claim for compensation for
personal injury (or for whatever compensable wrong is at issue in the
matter before it). The court does not regard its adjudicative purpose as
suddenly shifting away from personal injury compensation-it does not
suddenly regard itself as having been transformed into a tool of
international relations. 43 Choice of law issues do not seek to interrupt
the adjudicative process or the effort to reach a fair disposition of the
claim, but rather to enhance the justice of the result by enabling the
court to give effect to an important feature of the context in which the
cause of action arose.
In domestic tort law determinations we routinely take into
account features of the relationship between the parties in question in
understanding the context of rights and obligations between them that
shapes the potential for recovery. For example, if someone intentionally
cuts me with a knife I might be entitled to compensation unless, of
course, she and I are patient and doctor and the cut is a competently
executed surgical incision. Indeed, we rarely conceive of liability in the
abstract, that is, as arising between complete strangers in a completely
neutral setting. Therefore, if a relationship between the parties indicates
the relevance of the law of some other place to a determination of their
rights and obligations, then this is simply another feature of the legal
context in which the harm occurred. The potential legal relevance of the
parties' relationship as two persons from a particular foreign country,
then, is no different from the potential legal relevance of, for example,
the relationship between a patient and a doctor. In this regard, the
reasonable expectations that would arise in the context of the parties'
relationship, are neither irrelevant nor incidental to a good rule for
43 This approach may be contrasted with the approach taken in the adjudication of a claim for
state immunity, in which the court must consider whether the requirements of international
relations operate as an external intervention depriving it of jurisdiction by overriding its mandate to
adjudicate a private claim.
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choice of law in tort-they are essential to it.44
If we treat applicable foreign law45 as a relevant feature of the
relationship between the parties only where the foreign law establishes
the contours of the rights and obligations between them, it becomes
clear that the coincidence of the parties personal law is only relevant
where it is more than merely a coincidence that comes to light after the
liability has arisen. The personal law of the parties is relevant only when
it gives rise to the reasonable expectations either (a) that the defendant
should have taken a particular degree of care not to harm the plaintiff,
or (b) that the plaintiff would be entitled to particular standards of
recovery if so harmed. Accordingly, for example, if two vehicles collide
on a road in Country A, the drivers would ordinarily expect to have their
respective fault and recovery determined in accordance with the law of
that country. If, in the course of resolving their dispute, they discover
44 Justice La Forest seemed ambivalent in Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1046 about the role of the
reasonable expectations standard. He begins his "Critique and Reformulation" by expressing
suspicion about the standard as follows:
What strikes me about the Anglo-Canadian choice of law rules as developed over the
past century is that they appear to have been applied with insufficient reference to the
underlying reality in which they operate and to general principles that should apply in
responding to that reality. Often the rules are mechanistically applied. At other times, they
seem to be based on the expectations of the parties, a somewhat fictional concept, or a sense
of "fairness" about the specific case, a reaction that is not subjected to analysis, but which
seems to be born of a disapproval of the rule adopted by a particular jurisdiction. The
truth is that a system of law built on what a particular court considers to be the expectations
of the parties or what it thinks is fair, without engaging in further probing about what it means
by this, does not bear the hallmarks of a rational system of law. [emphasis added]
However, later on in the judgment, at 1050, ibid., La Forest J. appeared to test the
operation of the territorial theory against the expectations of the parties as follows:
I have thus far framed the arguments favouring the lex loci delicti in theoretical terms. But
the approach responds to a number of sound practical considerations. The rule has the
advantage of certainty, ease of application and predictability. Moreover, it would seem to
meet normal expectations. Ordinarily people expect their activities to be governed by the law
of the place where they happen to be and expect that concomitant legal benefits and
responsibilities will be defined accordingly. The government of that place is the only one
with power to deal with these activities. The same expectation is ordinarily shared by
other states and by people outside the place where an activity occurs. If other states
routinely applied their laws to activities taking place elsewhere, confusion would be the
result. In our modern world of easy travel and with the emergence of a global economic
order, chaotic situations would often result if the principle of territorial jurisdiction were
not, at least generally, respected. Stability of transactions and well grounded legal
expectations must be respected. [emphasis added]
Others express unequivocal support for the standard. For example, Peter Nygh states that "the first
objective of a choice of law rule should be to meet the reasonable expectations of the party or
parties to the transaction": Nygh, supra note 33 at 22.
45 "Foreign law" as used here is meant to include the law of another province or state within a
federation.
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that they are both from Country B, this is merely coincidental and not
legally relevant. It had no bearing on their relationship when the harmful
event occurred and should not meaningfully affect the legal standards
governing liability or recovery.46 However, if for example, it is a
passenger from Country B seeking recovery from the driver from
Country B, their relationship when the harmful event occurred might
make the legal standards of Country B relevant even though the collision
occurred in Country A. 4 7
Treating applicable foreign law as a relevant feature of the
relationship between the parties that can affect the legal standards
governing the claim also helps to clarify the approach that should be
taken in situations in which an act in one country causes harm in
another. As suggested by familiar reasoning regarding product liability,"
it is reasonable to expect that products intended to be used or consumed
by a particular group of consumers will conform to the consumer
protection standards established for that group. Where that group is
defined as a group of consumers in a particular country, it is reasonable
to assume that the products must conform to the consumer protection
standards of that country (regardless of where the products originate). If
the products fail to meet those standards and cause harm to a consumer
in that country the recovery standards of that country will apply.
However, where a consumer obtains a product in one country and is
harmed by it in a country in which the producer would not reasonably
expect the product to have been used or consumed, it is unjust to apply
the standards of the country in which the harm was actually suffered.
Finally, treating applicable foreign law as a relevant feature of
the relationship between the parties that affects the legal standards
governing the claim also assists in the analysis of claims involving
multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants where, for example, some of
the plaintiffs or defendants have the same personal law. It is commonly
accepted that in a negligence claim, say, against the providers of medical
care, different standards could apply to different defendants based on
their different roles and responsibilities. In respect of a single instance of
negligence, it is conceivable that the different standards of care might be
applied to the head surgeon, the resident, and the nurse. It is surprising,
46 In just such a case in Boys, supra note 4, the House of Lords applied the personal law of the
parties. Peter Nygh questioned this result asking, "Are we not replacing one fortuitous circumstance
with another?": Nygh, supra note 33 at 341. Although this article advances reasoning that would
support Nygh's doubts, it is acknowledged that the view expressed by the Law Commission and
referred to in note 13, supra, would support the result in Boys.
47 As was determined to be the case, inter alia, in Babcock v.Jackson (1963), 12 N.Y. (2d) 473.
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then, in claims brought by passengers in cars visiting from other
countries, to see courts hesitate to distinguish between the liability
standards for the driver of the car in which the passenger was riding
from the driver of the car with which they collided. It would seem that,
where appropriate, it should be open to the court to apply the personal
law of the parties to the claim by the injured passenger against the driver
of that car and yet to apply the lex loci to the claim by the injured
passenger against the driver of the other car. Surely, too, a similar
distinction between applicable laws should be available where the local
driver has also been injured and joins the injured passenger in claiming
against the foreign driver of the car in which the passenger was riding
(i.e., the lex loci would apply to the claim by the local driver) even where
the personal law of the parties applied to the claim by the passenger.
There is no doubt that the possibility of applying more than one law in a
case involving multiple parties adds to the complexity of the
determination and would, at some point, defeat the benefits of joinder.
However, this problem is not unique to situations involving the potential
application of foreign law. It is a regular feature of determinations of the
proper size and scope of group claims and class proceedings, and it
should not serve to preclude precision in the application of foreign law
where this would enhance the justice of the result in a claim in which it is
appropriate to apply more than one law.
A hypothetical situation might help to illustrate these points: in
publishing an article in this journal, it is generally hoped that it will be
read by persons who are interested in the legal issues it addresses. It is
possible that the interests of some of those persons could arise from
their direct participation in a particular legal dispute. It is further
possible that some of those persons could choose to treat the article as
legal advice. If they based a submission to a court on the reasoning
contained in the article and it was rejected, they could regard themselves
as having been harmed by reading the article. But we might say that it
was not reasonable for them to treat the article as legal advice because
the author is an academic and articles published in legal periodicals are
not intended to be taken as advice in particular cases-they are intended
to be considered as an occasion to reflect on the state of the law. In this
context it would not be within the reasonable expectations of the parties
for the reader to obtain recovery from the author for having been
negligent in providing legal advice.
What if it happened that the author was licensed to practise law
or was a member of the bar? Would that change the reasonable
expectations of the parties? No, we would probably say that it would not
because the context (i.e., the publication of the article in a scholarly
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journal) would not have changed. In this sense the author's
qualifications regarding the practice of law would be a matter of
happenstance and legally irrelevant. Accordingly, even if it was the case
that the person had read the article to obtain legal advice and the author
was someone who was licensed to provide legal advice-in other words,
that the parties independently had the status of client and solicitor,
respectively-we would still not find the author liable for having failed to
meet the standards for providing legal advice.
What if the person who took the article to be legal advice lived in
a community in which there was no meaningful distinction between
academics and practising lawyers and journal articles were routinely
treated as a basis for ordering one's legal affairs? Again, we would
probably say that the reasonable expectations of the parties would not be
affected. It would not be reasonable to expect that an author in this
journal would anticipate the effect of the article upon a readership that
would treat it as legal advice. However, it would be reasonable to expect
that a reader in a community that treated journal articles as legal advice
would take the initiative to become acquainted with the standards for
legal academic publishing that would apply to this journal.
What if the journal in which this article appeared was based in a
community in which journal articles were routinely treated as legal
advice and the author was aware of this? Then, and only then, are we
likely to regard it as reasonable to expect the author to act in accordance
with the possibility that the article might cause harm to persons who
treated it as providing legal advice.
There is nothing particularly remarkable about the foregoing
analysis. It is simply a function of the application of standard tort law
reasoning to choice of law analysis. In this regard, reasonable
expectations arising from the relationship between the parties are not
merely of dubious relevance to choice of law in tort in this example, they
are the key principle underlying the choice of law analysis.
In sum, as a unifying theory, I suggest that choice of law in tort
should be guided by the underlying principles of tort law itself and that
foreign law should apply where the relationship between the parties at
the time the harmful event occurs gives rise to the reasonable
expectation that the standards of another legal system should determine
the parties' rights and obligations. While there may be nothing "new"
about seeking guidance in the reasonable expectations of the parties, it
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seems to be a principle worth reconsidering. 48
VIII. A NEW RULE FROM THE OLD EXCEPTION
If meeting the reasonable expectations of the parties based on
the underlying principles of tort law can serve as a general guide or
fundamental rationale for choice of law analysis in tort, it may be helpful
at a theoretical level. However, as the judgments of Canadian courts
considering such questions after Tolofson suggest, courts are likely to
benefit from the detail and specificity found in well formulated rules
founded on these underlying principles. How might such rules be
articulated?
We have suggested that the broad consensus regarding choice of
law in tort that has resulted in a convergence of judicial practice is the
product not of shared appreciation of the rationale for choice of law
analysis so much as it is the product of shared appreciation of the
rationale for tort law. To the extent that this is true, it would seem that
we might sensibly refer to rules that have been formulated by those
whose expertise is, perhaps, greatest in the art of formulating private law
rules: the drafters of civil codes. As was noted earlier, the European
codifications of choice of law in tort frequently begin with the general
application of the lex loci. Then, in a range of exceptions that are
difficult to categorize, they seek to accommodate situations such as
those in which the tort has involved wrongful conduct in one place and
harm in another, and those in which there is a stronger relationship to a
place other than that in which the tort occurred.49 Although these
various exceptions seem likely to improve the fairness of the result in
more cases, their sheer variety and evident lack of flexibility reduce the
likelihood that they will assist in this inquiry.
However, in one particularly interesting formulation, that found
in the Swiss Code on Conflict of Laws,50 the rule and the exception are
reversed. Article 133 of that statute provides:
48 While this article advocates the reconsideration of an approach that has been superceded in
other contexts in the conflict of laws, it does not intend to promote the view that "conflicts theories
are essentially cyclical": see C. Walsh, supra note 14 at 99. While precedents can be found for most
ideas in the conflict of laws, and they are not "new" in that sense, I find it difficult to accept that the
law is just "going around in circles."
49 See Conflict of Laws, supra note 24 at 134-37.
50 P.A. Karrer & K.W. Arnold, Switzerland's Private International Law Statute of December 18,
1987, The Swiss Code on Conflict of Laws and Related Legislation, (Boston: Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, 1989).
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1. If the damaging and the damaged parties have their habitual residences in the
same country, claims based on unlawful acts are governed by the law of that country.
2. If the damaging and the damaged parties do not have their habitual residences
in the same country, the law of the country where the unlawful act was committed is
applicable. If the effect did not occur in the country where the unlawful act was
committed, the law of the country where the effect occurred is applicable if the damaging
party should have expected the effect to occur in that country.
3. Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2, claims based on an unlawful act violating
an existing legal relationship between the damaging and the damaged party are governed
by the law that applies to the pre-existing legal relationship.
As mentioned above, the striking feature of this formulation is
that the positions of the standard rule and exception have been reversed.
In other words, what amounts to the general rule is found in the first
part of the second rule (i.e., "If the damaging and the damaged parties
do not have their habitual residences in the same country, the law of the
country where the unlawful act was committed is applicable,") and the
typical exception for foreigners who have the same personal laws is
found in the first part (i.e., "If the damaging and the damaged parties
have their habitual residences in the same country, claims based on
unlawful acts are governed by the law of that country.")
Careful reflection on this produces an interesting insight into our
own approach to tort liability. We tend to base our abstract formulation
of tort liability on situations in which the parties have no relationship
with one another: we begin with situations in which, all things being
equal, the rights and obligations of persons are conceived of as between
perfect strangers. But things are seldom equal. In tort law, we rapidly
progress from this abstract construct to the reality of the rich array of
relationships in our society that dictate the rights and obligations of the
parties: doctor and patient, manufacturer and consumer, employer and
employee, etc. It soon becomes apparent that tort liability rarely arises
between "perfect strangers"-i.e., those who have no definable
relationship to one another-and the notion of liability as between
perfect strangers is, therefore, a rarely invoked, default concept.
Upon further reflection, it occurs that most situations in which
persons have discernible rights and obligations to one another can be
described in terms of one sort of relationship or another. This
relationship forms the focus of the determination of liability when a right
has been infringed or an obligation has not been met. Accordingly, the
third provision in Article 133 (i.e., "claims based on an unlawful act
violating an existing legal relationship between the damaging and the
damaged party are governed by the law that applies to the pre-existing
legal relationship") seems to best articulate the tort analysis that is so
common place to us as to be readily overlooked. Only in the absence of
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such a relationship do we need to resort to the standards that apply
generally in society in respect of "perfect strangers"-i.e., to the "When
in Rome..." concept. One stopping point before reaching this default
point occurs with the situation in which the parties have no defined
relationship of rights and obligations but for their relationship to one
another as persons from the same foreign country. The extent that their
common background is relevant to their mutual rights and obligations
should be taken into account in determining tort liability. Returning to
the new general rule-that based on the parties' relationship-it also
seems clear that to the extent that this relationship is guided by
standards of another legal system, it is appropriate to take those
standards into account.
Accordingly, I suggest that, in choice of law in tort, it would be
more helpful to stop treating the social context in which a tort occurs as
competing with its geographical contextSl i.e., as an alternative basis for
the legal standards that should be applied to determine liability. Rather,
we should treat the social context as the general rule and the
geographical context as an alternative in default of a legally relevant
relationship between the parties. This analysis can be summarized in the
following two rules:
1. Where the relationship between the parties makes it
reasonable for liability and recovery to be governed by the
standards of a particular legal system, those standards should
apply to claims between them in tort.
2. Where no such relationship exists, the law of the place where
the tort occurs should ordinarily apply.
Is it necessary to formulate a further rule for crossborder torts,
i.e., those in which wrongful conduct causes harm in another place? It
would seem not because the result in those cases would seem to follow
from the first rule and would depend on the nature of the relationship.
For example, in consumer matters we generally permit consumers to rely
on producers or manufacturers to meet the standards set for consumers'
protection and would, therefore, tend to permit consumers to rely on the
rights they enjoy in the place where they obtain and use products.
However, where persons assume responsibility, in one way or another,
for ensuring that the products are suitable for their needs, we tend to
51 The distinction between social and geographical context is used to explain the theory of the
"proper law of the tort" in Cheshire & North. See P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire & North's
Private International Law, 12 ed (London: Butterworths, 1992) at 530.
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permit the producers or manufacturers greater latitude to rely on the
standards they would expect to govern them. We would therefore, tend
to permit manufacturers to rely on the standards they would expect in
the place of production or, at least on the standards they would expect to
be required to meet in the place where they reasonably expect the
product to be used.
IX. FEDERALISM: INTERPROVINCIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CASES
Even if we have identified an appropriate guiding principle and
fashioned from it a rule that meets the decisionmaking needs of our
courts, our journey is not yet over. Earlier on, at the "critical juncture," I
proposed not to affirm the distinction between interprovincial and
international cases in choice of law analysis but, instead, to question the
apparent elimination of the flexible exception by the Tolofson authority.
It is now worth returning to that juncture to consider the implications of
the distinction between interprovincial and international cases.52
Do the principles governing choice of law in international cases
differ from those governing choice of law in interprovincial cases? It was
suggested in Tolofson that choice of law rules are rooted in traditional
principles of public international law-sovereignty, territoriality and
comity-but La Forest J. formulated from them a choice of law rule for
interprovincial torts. He seemed less determined to insist on rigid
adherence to the lex loci in international cases than he did in
interprovincial cases and he confined his criticism of the flexible
exception to interprovincial cases. Does this suggest that the balance of
"order" and "fairness" in international cases, as distinguished from
interprovincial cases, might favour fairness to individual litigants at the
expense of order? Alternatively, if choice of law in tort rules are
grounded in tort principles and if comity is no less offended by the
failure to apply the personal law of the parties when appropriate than by
the failure to apply the lex loci when appropriate, the relationship
52 For the purposes of this article, "interprovincial" cases differ from "international" cases as
follows: a case that contains elements that lead to the possibility of applying the law of another
country is an international case and a case that contains elements that lead to the possibility of
applying the law of another province is an interprovincial case. This distinction has troubled some.
See, for example, V. Black, "Crash: The Ontario Court of Appeal Bumps into Tolofson" (1998) 41
C.C.L.T. (2d) 170. Following the reasoning above suggesting that courts should be able to apply
more than one law to a claim to the extent that this is feasible, claims could be both interprovincial
and international where they included elements that gave rise to the possibility of applying either
(or both) the laws of another province and the laws of another country.
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between legal systems on the international plane would appear not to
give rise to any particular requirements at all. To return to the analysis
of Hanlan,53 the questions would simply be whether persons in Hanlan's
family's position would reasonably expect a different result to arise from
the fact of his having crossed, say, the Manitoba border rather than the
Minnesota border. That is, would it be reasonable to expect Hanlan's
and Sernesky's rights and obligations inter se to be governed by Ontario
law wherever they go when they travel in other countries but not when
they travel in other provinces? Would this distinction not seem
fortuitous?
The distinction would indeed seem fortuitous based only upon
reference to the principles of international law and the principles of tort
law. Is it possible, though, that there could be a need to make such a
distinction for the purposes of Canadian federalism? That is, could
Canadian conflict of laws rules, based on a system devised to address
conflict of laws on the international plane, need modification to meet
the special requirements of the relations between the legal systems
within the Canadian federation-requirements grounded in the
Constitution Act, 1867?54 Indeed, La Forest, J. seemed particularly
determined to ensure that the rules were applied consistently in
interprovincial cases. But what are the "constitutional imperatives and
other structural elements" 55 that shape Canadian choice of law analysis?
Although he declined to pronounce at length on the constitutional issues
(because they were presented merely as a backdrop to the other issues in
the case), La Forest J. described them as follows:
Unless the courts' power to create law in this area exists independently of provincial
power ... then the courts would appear to be limited in exercising their powers to the
same extent as the provincial legislatures. I note that provincial legislative power in this
area would appear to rest on s. 92(13)--"Property and Civil Rights in the Province." If a
court is thus confined, it is obvious that an extensive concept of "proper law of the tort"
might well give rise to constitutional difficulties. 56
As an integral part of the adjudication of a private dispute, it is
not obvious how choice of law comes to be regulated by a constitutional
provision for legislative authority. To be sure, provincial legislators must
comply with the restrictions placed on the scope of their authority by
section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and make laws to govern matters
5 3 Supra note 2.
54 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
55 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1048.
56 1bid. at 1065.
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of private law within the province. However, the courts are not
constrained to devote themselves solely to the task of implementing
provincial legislation in matters arising in the province. They are
engaged in dispute resolution. The disputes they resolve might have
arisen, partly or entirely, outside the province and they might involve
persons, some or all of whom, might come from outside the province.
Choice of law analysis itself relies upon the courts' capacity to apply the
law of another place to a dispute before them. In doing so, it is not clear
why courts should be constrained to apply the law of the place where the
tort occurred regardless of other potentially relevant elements. After all,
as La Forest J. himself observed in Tolofson, "The court takes
jurisdiction not to administer local law, but for the convenience of
litigants, with a view to responding to modern mobility and the needs of
a world or national economic order."5 7 In short, although the subject
matter of choice of law analysis is prescriptive in nature and, therefore,
governed by section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the process of
deciding which law should apply is adjudicative in nature and the
authority for it is therefore found in section 129-not section 92.
What does seem clear, though, is that we are dealing with what
La Forest J. described as a "structural" problem. As he explained, "The
nature of our constitutional arrangements-a single country with
different provinces exercising territorial legislative jurisdiction-would
seem to me to support a rule that is certain and that ensures that an act
committed in one part of this country will be given the same legal effect
throughout the country."58 Accordingly, it might be suggested that one
constitutional imperative for choice of law rules is that they produce
decisional harmony-outcomes that do not vary with the forum
determining the matter.
The reasons for this imperative are rooted in the developments
that began with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Morguard. As
a result of Morguard, it is no longer necessary to secure a defendant's
consent to be sued in a forum in a province other than one in which the
defendant can be served. La Forest J. explained in Morguard that this
newly found freedom of forum selection should not create a risk of
prejudice to defendants and it should not create an opportunity for
57Jbai. at 1070.
58 Ibid. at 1064. This was the view taken by Wilson and Gaudron JJ. of the High Court of
Australia in Breavington, supra note 21 at 98 although the subsequent majority decisions of that
court in McKain, supra note 21 and Stevens, supra note 21, did not seek to ground choice of law rules
in the Australian Constitution. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900 (U.K.), 63 & 64
Vict., c. 12. For recent considerations of these issues, see Pfeiffer, supra note 21.
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abuse by plaintiffs.59 The potential for prejudice and abuse is minimal
because judicial processes are fairly uniform across Canada and the
standards for the administration of justice in the superior courts of the
provinces provide a uniform basis for confidence in the administration of
justice regardless of where a matter is tried.
However, there remains an opportunity for abuse of this
freedom of forum selection if it brings with it the potential to manipulate
the governing law. If, by choosing a particular forum, a plaintiff can
secure or avoid the application of a particular provision of one
province's laws, and thereby affect the outcome of the litigation, then the
incentive to engage in forum shopping will remain. Accordingly, it is
imperative in interprovincial cases that Canadian courts apply uniform,
forum-neutral choice of law rules (i.e., those that produce the same
result regardless of which court applies them). This will foster the
necessary decisional harmony in choice of law analysis to reduce the
occasions in which there is an incentive to engage in forum shopping.60
In this regard, it could be suggested that this "structural problem" might
best be resolved through a clear assertion on the part of the Supreme
Court that the constitutional imperatives include the requirement that
there be one national set of choice of law rules. Unlike substantive rules
of private law which, under the Canadian Constitution, can vary from
province to province, such variation in choice of law rules could give rise
to forum shopping which would be unacceptable in Canada.
It is not clear, however, how this "structural problem," which
gives rise to the need for "order" in choice of law, militates strongly in
favour of the lex loci delicti rule.61 Restricting resort to a flexible
exception could only be justified as a way of preventing undue
application of local law. It is true that a flexible exception, on occasion,
would result in the application of local law but there is no reason in
5 9 This fact is made clear in Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1099-1103.
60 This has been regarded as a constitutional requirement of Australian federalism as well,
although there has been considerable controversy on the matter. See generally Breavington, supra
note 21 and, in particular, the judgment of Deane J. at 121, and note his tenacity in Stevens, supra
note 21 when, despite the revival of the old common law choice of law rule in the intervening
decision in McKain, supra note 21, he remained adamant that the Australian Constitution required
that reference to the lexfori should be limited so as to discourage forum shopping. The Australian
Law Reform Commission, in its report entitled Choice of Low, Report No. 58 (1992) suggests that
cross-vesting legislation such as the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act, 1987, which had a
similarly liberating effect on interstate litigation in Australia as the Morguard decision had on
interprovincial litigation in Canada, made similarly urgent the establishment of decisional harmony
in choice of law rules.
61 Tolofson, supra note 1 at 1064.
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principle why it might not also form the basis for the application of some
other law to events that occurred locally. As was pointed out earlier,
local law would not be applied because it was the law of the forum but
because it was connected to the matter in some other way, for example,
as the personal law of the parties. The only bases for concern about
undue use of the flexible exception, then, could be a lack of confidence
in the courts' competence to assess the relevant factors consistently and
reliably, or a suspicion that courts would invoke the exception out of
undue sympathy to the plaintiff and indifference to the importance of
forum-neutral choice of law analysis. There is good reason to regard
both these bases for concern as unfounded. Canadian courts have
demonstrated considerable evenhandedness in the adjudication of forum
disputes; it will be recalled that it was the dissatisfaction of lower courts
with the prevailing forum-centred choice of law rule in tort that
ultimately brought about the reconsideration of the law in Tolofson.62 In
one recent example, a British Columbia court applied its own law in a
claim between two local residents to the determination of damages
despite the fact that the injury had occurred in California, demonstrating
that courts do not apply the parties' personal law only when it coincides
with the lex loci and secures more favourable recovery for the plaintiff.63
Decisional harmony can be achieved through the application of
uniform, forum-neutral choice of law rules. It is not necessary to require
courts to apply the lex loci to every tort case with connections to more
than one province. The "order" that is the "precondition to justice" need
not come at the expense of "fairness" in the individual case. Decisional
harmony would prevail as long as the choice between the lex loci and the
other potentially applicable law was made through application of the
same rule to the facts of the case (for example, whether a relationship
between the parties indicated that it would be reasonable for their
dispute to be governed by another potentially applicable law). "Order" is
undermined only by the application of arbitrary choice of law rules that
produce predictably inconsistent results. As has been observed, rules
that arbitrarily dictate application of the lexfori exemplify this and they
encourage manipulative tactics. Further, to achieve order it is not
necessary to guarantee that every Canadian court decides the choice of
law question in precisely the same way in any given case. No such
certainty exists with respect to determinations in domestic cases. Rather,
it is necessary only to establish a basis for confidence that the potential
62 For example in Grimes v. Cloutier (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.).
63 Wong v. We! (1999), 45 C.C.L.T. (2d) 105 (B.C. S.C.).
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for variation is the same between courts within one province as it is
between courts in different provinces.
How does the desire for decisional harmony distinguish
interprovincial from international cases? Perhaps it does not. Although
there remains some controversy,64 the prevailing Canadian approach to
conflict of laws favours decisional harmony both in interprovincial cases
and in international cases. While decisional harmony might be regarded
as desirable in international cases, it occurs only if the choice of law rules
of the two countries happen to coincide. It is regarded as particularly
important in interprovincial cases, however, because the Morguard
principles create such freedom in forum selection that the potential for
abusive forum shopping can be held in check only by eliminating the
root incentive to engage in it.6S Fortunately, decisional harmony, can be
secured in Canada through the authoritative harmonization of conflict of
laws rules such as occurred in Tolofson.66 However, it would appear
desirable, to the extent that it is possible, to converge on a rule that has
the more widespread support than does the rule requiring strict
adherence to the lex loci. This approach would seem to favour a rule
such as that suggested in this article as it seems more consistent with the
rules applied elsewhere.
X. CONCLUSION?
We have arrived at a convenient point to pause and reflect on
the journey so far. We began by observing that there is widespread
consensus that it was no longer appropriate to apply the lex fori in tort
cases with strong connections to other 'legal systems. This consensus
trend away from the lex fori marked more than just a milestone in the
development of the choice of law rule, it marked the beginning of this
64 According to John Swan, "federalism is based on the right of each of the component parts
of a federation to differ on how various legal problems should be resolved. This right extends to the
decisions of provincial courts to differ in their decisions, even when they differ in the results reached
in identical cases": Swan, supra note 11 at 937. This appears to be a minority view.
65 As long as Canadian courts continue to apply Morguard principles to international cases,
the question arises whether they do so unaware of the lack of ability to secure decisional harmony,
inter alia, through uniform choice of law rules, and the resulting persistence of opportunities for
forum shopping on the international plane. It is unfortunate that the Court did not take the
opportunity in the course of its reasons in Tolofson to comment on this application of Morguard in
the course of the analysis of the inherent "structural problem" involved.
66 This was the conclusion reached in Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No. 58.
Choice of Law (Sydney: The Law Reform Commission, 1992) at 11-15.
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development. This trend emerged because tort law itself had evolved. It
had ceased to be a form of quasi-public law in which the courts were
obliged to promote local standards of conduct, and it had become more
genuinely a form of private law in which the courts could focus on
achieving the right result between the parties, free of this obligation.
Although the courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that
the lex fori should not be applied to resolve tort claims, they have
wavered between applying the lex loci and, by way of exception, some
other law more closely connected to the case, usually the personal law of
the parties.
Although there is also fairly widespread consensus that it is
appropriate to apply a rule favouring the lex loci and some form of
exception (generally one involving the personal law of the parties), there
continues to be some controversy and uncertainty about the nature and
scope of the exception and when it should apply. In Tolofson, the
Supreme Court of Canada addressed this uncertainty by advancing a
theory of choice of law in tort based on the public international law
principles of sovereignty, territoriality and comity which favoured
application of the lex loci and expressed doubt about the merit of an
exception. Laudable though the effort was to construct a unifying theory,
the theory failed to provide a cogent explanation for the courts' desire to
apply the lex loci when they sensed that this was appropriate, and it
failed to permit the courts to apply the exception to the lex loci when
they sensed that this was appropriate.
Turning to the possibility that an underlying rationale could be
discerned in a rule that accurately reflected the tendencies of the courts
as indicated in their rulings, we examined the provision in the 1995
United Kingdom legislation.67 Accurate and clear though this provision
was, it failed to provide insight into how and when a court would
determine that some factor other than the location of the tort would be
significant enough to warrant the displacement of the lex loci by a more
appropriate applicable law. The puzzle remained as to how some courts
could have such a clear and compelling sense of which law should
govern, even in the face of potentially contrary authority, when neither
appellate courts, nor law reform commissioners, nor legislators, nor
academics had been able to articulate the rule or identify the underlying
rationale.
This puzzle was solved with the realization that courts' context
for the choice of law question was not the traditional public international
law principles of sovereignty, territoriality and comity, but the private
6 7 PIL, supra note 23.
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law principles of the particular area of law in which the question arose.
Thus, in deciding a question of choice of law in tort, courts would tend
to be guided by the underlying principles of tort law, with which they felt
quite familiar. In this sense, just as Professor Castel suggested, they
would readily apply the "law most substantially connected" to the case,
as directed by ordinary tort principles. Should existing conflict of laws
doctrine appear to dictate a result inconsistent with the far more familiar
and compelling requirements of tort law, again, as Professor Castel
suggested, the courts would manipulate the choice of law rules to
produce a result consistent with tort principles, confident that this would
produce a just outcome in the case as they saw it.
If the underlying rationale for the choice of law rule in tort is
based on tort principles, then it might be described as seeking to meet
reasonable expectations based on the relationship between the parties.
While this is not the first occasion in which this rationale has been put
forward, it deserves reconsideration as a foundational principle on the
basis that the objectives of rules for choice of law in tort are to support
the underlying principles of tort law. Courts deciding questions of choice
of law in tort do so in the context of tort claims in which they seek to do
justice between the parties in terms of tort principles.
According to basic tort principles, the standards for recovery are
generally adjusted and refined through reference to the particular nature
of the relationship between the parties (i.e., the social context). It is only
when the parties have no relationship to shape their expectations
(regarding the need to take care not to harm one another, or the kind of
compensation that would be owed in the event of harm) that we resort to
default standards appropriate, for example, to situations involving
strangers in the street (i.e., the geographical context). Thus, in a case
involving foreign elements, the lex loci is not the main standard but one
that operates merely in default of any relationship between the parties
that would support a more meaningful determination of the parties'
rights and obligations. Where the parties have some definable
relationship when the tort occurs (even if it is only a shared common
foreign background) which would indicate the reasonableness of the
expectation that tort recovery between them would be governed by a
foreign law, it might seem obvious to a court adjudicating a tort claim
that this law should apply. In this sense, it makes more sense to treat this
situation not as an exception but as the general rule. Then we would
resort to the lex loci only when, in the absence of a relationship between
the parties at the time of the tort, they would reasonably expect to be
governed by the law prevailing in the place where the tort occurred. By
reversing the roles of what have been described as the rule (which refers
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to the geographical context) and the exception (which refers to the social
context), we are reminded of the underlying rationale for referring to
them, i.e., the "theory" explaining this choice of law analysis in tort.
And so we have it: a newly formulated rule based on a newly
revived theory. No doubt others will refine and rebut them. In time,
further evolution in tort law itself will necessitate revision of the choice
of law rules. (Indeed, the increasing prevalence of no-fault based
compensation schemes may already be rendering these choice of law
rules obsolete.) But perhaps we now have a better idea why, as Professor
Castel observed, some courts seem able to forge ahead with confidence,
in the face of conflicting rules and theories, to produce results that seem
perfectly sound to them and to us.
Are we there yet? No, Jean, but thanks to these and other
remarkable insights of yours we are well on our way.

